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SEMESTER IV

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Its roots may be traced to the Zealots[1] and the Assassins[2] culminating in the theories of social revolution, starting with the French revolution and proceeding to Marxism and Anarchism. However, terrorism which took a new turn in the 20th century

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[1]   Zealots were the Jewish religious-political faction of Judah which existed for a period of about 70 years or more in the 1st century CE. The Zealots consisted of factions where a terrorists group, the Sicarii from the Greek, assassinated both Jewish and Roman leaders with daggers. These actions were sometimes also directed towards ordinary citizens and in public places.

[2]   Assassins were active in the coastal mountains of the Levant and later in the Alamut from the 8th to the 14th century. Assassins killed members of the Abbasid and Seljuk elite for political and religious reasons but mostly targeted the Sunni Muslims. It is commonly believed that Assassins were under the influence of hashish and opium during their killings and indoctrination.

in the form of anti-colonial insurgencies, has, in the current 21st century, been described as "post-modern terrorism" in the sense that it is no longer driven by ideologies alone but is now more ethnic and separatist in nature. Despite all this terrorism has become a puzzle, which every country of the world is aiming to solve, as it involves a threat to their sovereignty and danger to the lives and liberty of their citizens. Yet the fact remains that "terrorism can't be 'defeated'- only reduced, attenuated, and to some degree controlled because counterterrorism even though it shares some attributes with warfare, is not accurately represented by the metaphor of a war. Unlike most wars, it has neither a fixed set of enemies nor the prospect of coming to closure, be it through a 'win' or some other kind of denouement"[3]. The problem assumes serious proposition considering the fact that 20 countries across the globe are the ones most afflicted by terrorism[4] and back home in India, according to the Union Home Ministry's Annual Report to Parliament, of the 35 states of today's India, 25 are afflicted by terrorism. Not only this, there are about 25

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[3] Pillar , R Paul (2001), Lessons and Futures in Terrorism and U.S. Foreign   Policy, Brookings Institution Press.

[4]   The data has been taken from the source http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/stats-on-human-rights/statistics-on-war-conflict/statistics-on-terrorism/

terrorists attack per month in India[5] .

Debates concerning Definition of terrorism

"Let us begin with the dictionary definition of terror– 'intense overpowering fear'– and of terrorism– 'the use of terrorizing methods of governing or resisting a government'. This simple definition has the virtue of fairness; it focuses on the use of coercive violence and its effects on the victims of terror without regard to the status of the perpetrator", wrote Ahmad (1968:3), and yet, leaving out the question of motivation from the list of definitions rather complicates the problem, leading to statements like 'one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist', which gives rise to two sorts of problem. The first involves the right to rebel against an oppressive government, whether native or colonial; and the second is the problem of the right of self-determination. The use of terrorist methods like bombing and assassination by the South African apartheid state is still fresh in the memory of sovereign states. The problem of insurgency in the troubled north-eastern states of India and the conflict between Israel and Palestine further complicates the problem because of the

[5] The statistics have been taken from the source http://www.indiaright.org/storyd. asp?id=511

motivations of, and the *modus operandi* used by, the groups and the states involved in the conflict. Ahmad himself mentions that states are selective in designating groups and states as 'terrorists'. To quote him, "We are expected to denounce the Palestinian terrorists, the Lebanese Muslims, the Italian Red Brigades, the Bader-Meinhof of Germany, but not the Nicaraguan Contras, nor the South African-sponsored and US-endorsed UNITA, nor even Afghanistan's Mujahideen" (Ahmad:1986:3).

Similar contradictions seem to concern sections of the left because those who showed sympathy to organisations (such as the Provisional IRA) using 'terrorist' methods in the 1970s now all too often take a completely opposite view of today's 'terrorism'. It is for this reason that Jenkin's argue that "the old 'terrorist' organisation, it seems, could be viewed positively since their actions could be justified in the name of a secular, progressive ideology, such as national liberation, anti-imperialism or socialism" (Jenkins 2006). Today's, terrorists by contrast, is seen as 'Islamofascist' or 'reactionary anti-capitalist', and therefore to be condemned as no different from (and possibly worse than) the system it is attacking[6]. Trotsky

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[6] But whatever the specific differences between terrorism currently and that of the past—and these are less than appearances suggest—the question of how to respond is one that socialists have frequently had to confront

seems to partially agree with Jenkins when he argues that, "Our class enemies are in the habit of complaining about our terrorism. What they mean by this is rather unclear. They would like to label all the activities of the proletariat directed against the class enemy's interests as terrorism. If terrorism is understood in this way as any action inspiring fear in, or doing harm to, the enemy, then of course the entire class struggle is nothing but terrorism. However, it must be said that when they reproach us with terrorism, they are trying—although not always consciously—to give the word a narrower, less indirect meaning. The damaging of machines by workers, for example, is terrorism in this strict sense of the word. The killing of an employer, a threat to set fire to a factory or a death threat to its owner, an assassination attempt, with revolver in hand, against a government minister—all these are terrorist acts in the full and authentic sense" (Trotsky 1911).

Thus a commonly accepted definition of terrorism would clarify two things. First, who has the legal as well as moral right to use violence or kill people? Second, under what

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(Jenkins 2006). Both Marx and Engels, on different occasions, had to respond to the kind of strategy that emphasised not mass action but actions carried out by individuals (such as blowing up buildings or assassinating hated individuals)—what came to be known as 'terrorism' in the latter half of the 19th century.

pretext or for what reasons can the killing of people be justified? In other words, if a definition of terrorism clarifies the 'agent' and 'cause' dilemma, then that definition would be acceptable to all and sundry. All attempts to define terrorism have revolved around these two central problems and yet it is easier said than done, since the use of terror is not merely dependent on the agents' intention and the means involved but even on the circumstances and the situation governing the particular use of the act of terror.

If one looks at the problem of agent first then one could say that the state is legally empowered to use violence if, and only if, there is a threat to its existence or to the life of its citizens. The problem arises when the state, under the garb of 'threat to sovereignty' and 'protection of the rights of the citizens', abuses its power and unleashes violence. Such abuse of power invokes the principle of the 'right of resistance or revolt' by the citizens. Keeping this debate in mind, Crozier (1960:27) makes a distinction between terror and counter-terror. He refers to terror as "a weapon used by the insurgents" and counter-terror as "the weapon used against the rebels by the government and security forces, whose authority is being challenged". The distinction is based on "initiation" or the "agent" who first uses violence. But the mere use of violence by one agent does not empower the other to use violence. Besides, as Thornton (1964:33) points out, "It is by no means

inevitable that the insurgents will initiate terrorism; in some instances, they may be reacting to the terror of the incumbents". Thornton, therefore, replaces the term "terror" and "counter-terror" with "agitational terror" and "enforcement terror" respectively. The former refers to "terrorist acts by those aspiring to power" while the latter denotes "terror launched by those in power". However, the distinction is incomplete as Wilkinson (1974:33) writes, "Neither 'enforcement' nor 'agitation' is a sufficiently comprehensive term to encompass the range of general aims which may motivate either incumbents or insurgents to employ terror". Wilkinson (1974:35), therefore, argues that the definition of terrorism should not be tied to the dichotomy of the ruler-ruled and should encompass motives other than revolution or repression.

Primoratz (1997) solves the problem of agent when he says that terrorism is always wrong as it involves intentional killing of "innocent people", thus, rejecting the view that the rightness of actions only depends on their results. However, he leaves undefined the term "innocent people". Nathanson (2004), taking the hint from Primoratz, carries forward the research with the intention of defining what being "innocent people" means. Nathanson (1997:14) suggests three criteria for labelling people as innocent: (a) they should not be public officials or members of the military; (b) they should not be responsible for the situation that the terrorists are protesting

against or seeking to change; and, (c) they should lack the power to respond to the terrorist's demand or goals.

Out of the three criteria, the first two appear to be a bit problematic, as they are discriminatory in nature. If one adopts the criteria laid down by Nathanson, then one is forced to justify the killing of the police and the Army personnel engaged in counter-terrorism by the terrorists. Besides, not all public officials are in a position to respond to the terrorists' demands or are responsible for their situation. That leaves one with the second and the third criteria, that is, innocent people are those who are not responsible for the situation, in the name of which the terrorists are protesting, and do not possess the power to satisfy the terrorists' demands. Even acceptance of these two criteria cannot justify the acts of killing by the terrorists. The concept of retributive justice as prevalent in some of the Islamic countries is not a sufficient guarantee for decline in crime. Besides, the acts of terrorists appear to be indiscriminate. Their target is symbolic. The victim could be anybody: private or public officials. Terrorists perceive that violence against public officials/ministers will draw greater public/media attention and thus will compel the government to surrender to their demands and goals, and, therefore, target public officials intentionally. Besides, going by the argument of Kant (1981:36) that "every individual should be treated as an end in itself", violence against him or her cannot be justified on any ground. Thus, making a distinction between public and

private officials and ministers or ordinary people, to justify acts of terrorism, is illogical. Moreover, one can raise the question that merely because such persons have the power to respond to the terrorist demands or may be responsible for the situation, does not give the terrorists the right to take the law into their hands and use terror against them.

Now, coming to the second problem involved in the definition of terrorism, one needs to analyse the 'means' and 'ends' debate concerning the use of violence. The debate is similar to the principle involved in *jus ad bellum* (the justice of entering into war) and *jus in bello* (the justice of the means one uses in fighting). However, if one goes by the principle that ends do not necessarily and always justify the means, then one could conclude that violence could never be the just means of achieving a noble end. To quote Nathanson (1997:5), "The slogan suggests that if people are freedom fighters, then their activities are justifiable. This reasoning, however, is flawed because it assumes that one can justify an act simply by citing the goal that it is supposed to achieve. Actions, however, may and may not be morally wrong even if their goals are lofty and valuable". The view is similar to that of Wilkinson (1981:468), "The present writer's position that terrorism, because it involves taking innocent lives, is never morally justifiable whatever the provocation, and that there is always some other means of resistance or opposition even in the most oppressive

societies, such as the Soviet Union, may not be widely shared".
In other words, motives alone do not convert an act of killing
into a justifiable act. The assertion of the legality of the
motives behind an act is important in making a distinction
between 'freedom fighters' and 'terrorists' and would
consequently have bearings upon the counter-terrorism
strategies of states and yet the argument suggests that no
motive is strong enough to allow a group or an individual or
even a state to kill people.

It, thus, appears that either violence, under all
circumstances and for every reason needs to be condemned or
else it will entrap one in a vicious cycle of terror and counter-
terror. The state as the embodiment of the rights and liberties of
the people has access to violence but every measure to prevent
its misuse needs to be taken both by the state and the civil
society rather than giving the masses the liberty to resort to
violence to undo the wrongs done by the violence of the state.
To quote Wilkinson (1981:468), "The fact that regimes are
frequently guilty of initiating the vicious spiral of terror and
counter-terror does not exonerate either side. We are not, as
apologists of terror and factional terrorism often pretend,
forced to choose between the torturer and the bomber. This
would be to fall into the logical fallacy of the excluded middle.
Surely, the only consistent moral position for a liberal
democrat must be unequivocal opposition to both the terror of

regime and terrorism by faction". Thus, there does not seem a possibility of arriving at a consensus definition of terrorism explaining the problem of 'agent' and 'cause' in the future because the answer involves subjectivity: the perception of the groups involved in the act of violence.

International Terrorism:

There is no basic difference between terrorism and international terrorism apart from the fact that they vary in their impact and scope. International terrorism refers to terrorism that goes beyond national boundaries in terms of the methods used, the people that are targeted or the places from which the terrorists operate. Otherwise the term terrorism carry the meaning, nature and features similar to international terrorism.

Mainstream IR Theories debates concerning the concept of terrorism/international terrorism

The above analysis reveals that the definition of the term 'terrorism' is not value neutral. Each discipline, even each writer, tends to treat terrorism, local or international, from its own narrow perspective shaped by the parameters of the discipline or the author's orientation. Accordingly one finds different perspectives dominating the mainstream International

Relations Theories concerning terrorism and counterterrorism.

According to Baregu (2007), there are two broad approaches that have dominated the literature on terrorism. One is the **behavioural approach**, which treats terrorists as abnormal or deviant radicals, religious fanatics or political ideologues. The second is the **structural approach** that aims at analysing the process involved in the conversion of an individual into an abnormal terrorist, deviant radical, religious fanatic or political ideologue by establishing a link between individual behaviour and the historical processes in which he operates. Baregu (2007), based on structural/behavioural dichotomy, argues that while the behavioural approach concentrates on studying the minds of the perpetrators, their feelings of jealousy, caprice, racial hatred, etc., religious fanaticism or fundamentalism, the structural approach puts the blame on the broader international environment, genuine grievances like exploitation, exclusion, deprivation or alienation and the changing norms, rules, structures and processes in the international system, for the perpetuation of terrorism.

The dichotomy inherent in Baregu's analysis is also reflected in Tellis' (2004) refusal to associate US war against terrorism with war against Islamic terrorism although one finds

the psychological analysis of criminal mind missing which is trivial for understanding why terrorists take recourse to terrorism. Tellis' treatment of terrorism as a response to US hegemonic project, as a resistance to US unipolarity reflecting the exploitative relations between the 'haves' and the 'have not's' doesn't look into the problem of terrorism abetting countries like India, Indonesia and Russia where terrorism is more of a response to secede from the union. Osama Bin Laden made an assessment similar to that propounded by the structuralists in an interview to John Miller (1999) wherein he said, "This is my message to the American people: to look for a serious government that looks out for their interests and doesn't attack others, their lands or their honor. And my word to American journalists is not to ask why we did this but ask what their government has done that forced us to defend ourselves[7]" which reveals that terrorists groups like Al Qaeda view the current balance of power prevailing in the international arena as exploitative and discriminatory to the Muslim countries.

However the belief that terrorism is a response to injustice and that terrorists are people driven to desperate actions by

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[7] Taken from an interview of Osama bin Laden conducted by John Miller in February 1999 for *Esquire*: Source: http://www.populistamerica.com/harry_browne_on_ fighting terrorism

intolerable conditions be it poverty, hopelessness, or political or social oppression has been challenged by scholars like Walter Laqueur. Laqueur wrote, "When the systematic study of terrorism began in the 1970s, it was—mistakenly—believed by some that terrorism was more or less a monopoly of extreme left-wing groups, such as the Italian Red Brigades or the German Red Army or various Latin American groups. (There was also ethnic-nationalist terrorism, such as in Northern Ireland, but it figured less prominently.) Hence the conclusion: Terrorism comes into being wherever people are most exploited and most cruelly oppressed. Terrorism, therefore, could easily be ended by removing exploitation and oppression. However, it should have been clear even then that this could not possibly be a correct explanation because terrorism had been altogether absent precisely in the most oppressive regimes of the 20th century—Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia" (Laqueur 2007). Kanti Bajpai too has dealt with the problem of terrorism from a very different perspective wherein he cites lack of proper devolution of power, the influx of migration and foreign hands as causes responsible for the growth of terrorism in countries like India, Indonesia and Russia (Bajpai 2002).

The realist school views terrorism as a proxy war waged by weaker states to change the prevailing power equation.

Realists believe that terrorism cannot survive without the state's support and, therefore, any counter-terrorism strategy which overlooks this fact is doomed to fail [8]. Pakistan's clandestine support to terrorism to balance against India is a case in point [9]. The realists, thus, makes the argument that policy-makers need to frame their counter-terrorism strategy aimed at self-preservation and balance of power in their favour which the terrorists seek to destabilise through their terrorist acts.

The American fight against Al Qaeda reflects the realist strategy of waging war on terror through the use of its supreme conventional forces and gaining the support of other states in this endeavour. Similarly, the United States-led Coalition forces' engagement in Afghanistan to wipe out the Taliban is also reflective of the realist approach to counter-terrorism, which is protecting the United States' interests and security from threats of Taliban and Al Qaeda. Security is the prime concern of nations. One could say that US intervention in the Middle East would have occurred even if September 11 incidence would not have occurred. PDD-42 (Presidential Decision Directive) was precisely created by President Clinton

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[8] For a better understanding, read Mearsheimer.

[9] Kapur (2009) has dealt with India's deterrent strategy against Pakistan in great detail from the realist's perspective.

for making sure that Americans remain the strongest force in the world for peace and freedom, security and prosperity. In a similar vein, Huntington's (1996) clash of civilisations theory views the war on terrorism as a war waged by the traditional Islamic world against the United States' ideals of democracy and modernity. The United States might not admit to adhering to this theory explicitly for fear of losing the support of the Islamic states, which is vital in its fight against terrorism, and yet the shadow of this theory cannot be entirely ruled out in its counter-terrorism strategy.

Contrary to the realist theory is the **neo-liberal** democratic theory and **institutional theory** which argue that negotiations, respect for the rights and dignity of the disaffected and spread of democratic ideals is the only way of tackling terrorism. They believe that multilateralism and strengthening of socio-economic and political institutions is more important for eradication of the grievances of the people who are behind the perpetuation of terrorism. Accordingly, they assign a greater role to world institutions and cooperation among the states in eradicating terrorism. This theory holds that Al Qaeda cannot be defeated in Afghanistan unless democratic ideals take roots in Afghanistan[10]. Even American authority accepts this line of thought to an extent which could be inferred from the American counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policy in

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[10] Although the argument that building up of democratic ideals and institutions can prevent terrorism has been contested by scholars. For details see Figure One.

Afghanistan whereby they have started investing in building institutions in Afghanistan and even supported the Afghan electoral process. US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice accepted that the Bush doctrine of fighting terrorism was an amalgam of pragmatic realism and Wilsonian liberal democracy[11] which could be clearly discerned from the US policy of spreading democracy in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Tellis too focuses on the twin objective of Bush administration in the post 9/11 era, i.e, defending against global terrorist insurgency and protecting US hegemonic position well into the future, yet he fails to mention as to how the global community is to be convinced of mutual benefits arising out of US war on terrorism while simultaneously maintaining its hegemony across the globe. A weekly newspaper in Cairo very well wrote, "The politically vacuous 'terrorist' label is a prominent fragment of highly radicalised hate rhetoric used to demonise third world people of colour in general and Arab Muslim people in particular. Ironically since terrorism is the central discourse currently justifying the US conquest of the Middle East, Arab American leaders who wish to build ties to the White House do so at the expense of confronting such labels or developing a politically useful critique of US imperialism"[12]. This aspect of US alienation from world politics is a weakness in realist's debate

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[11]   The fact has been better discussed by Snyder (2004) in his article, "One World, Rival Theories".

[12] Wisdom real politic and terrorism, Websters New World Dictionary, http://www.twf.org/library.html

concerning terrorism and counterterrorism.

Liberals believe that timely and imaginative social, economic, political and administrative engineering can fix the grievances of rebellious populations, isolate the terrorists who are fighting on their behalf and allow the authorities to capture or eliminate them. Peter Alexander Meyer's (2001) view seems more near to liberal prescription for terrorism. He writes, "Only talk can prevent terrorism or prevent single localised acts of violence from producing widespread terrifying effects. Infectious terrorism spreading out from one ground zero through millions of television and into every home and human spirit, kills automatically public talk. Thus as the terrorist says our words, he attacks the future". Even the liberal prescription that one should promote liberal democracy not only as a means to greater security but as an end in itself has not many borrowers. Edward D Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995) wrote, "We found that democratising states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change". Not to forget that US has fought more wars than any other single state.

Globalism or neo-Marxist, in conjunction with the anti-imperialist theory, holds that terrorism is the outward manifestation of the exploitative nature of relations between the developed and the developing states. Their suggestion is that until this exploitative relationship is corrected, terrorism is

unlikely to subside. Thus, they justify the Al Qaeda attack on the United States as representative of the exploitative nature of international relations vis-à-vis the developing and developed nations of the world. A somewhat similar view has been expressed by the structural and the behavioural theory regarding the genesis of terrorism.

The Marxists believe that the question of terrorism is inextricably bound up with the class struggle: that's where it comes from. In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels state that 'ever since the end of primitive communist society, history is essentially the history of the class struggle. And this history is full of violence and terror from above — by the ruling class — and also of terrorist acts from below — by the oppressed masses. Of course, terrorism is not the only form of political struggle but it is one of the most common, today and historically — and necessarily so'. Trotsky wrote a series of articles on terrorism which eloquently summarise the Marxist case, and these have been collected in an accessible pamphlet, *Marxism and Terrorism* [13]. The Russian Marxists made a distinction between their attitude to terrorism and their attitude

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[13] Leon Trotsky's wrote two critiques of individual terrorism—the first written in 1909, in response to the unmasking of the assassin of Plehve as a police agent, and the second in 1911, in response to terrorist moods in the Austrian working class.

to the terrorists[14]. The former they rejected uncompromisingly, while the latter had all their sympathy, and their personal courage was always acknowledged. Ruling class politicians and their media habitually denounce terrorists as 'cowards', 'evil' and 'subhuman' (Molyneux 2004). The Russian Marxists had no truck with such notions, and never contemplated moderating their own opposition to Tsarism on account of 'the terrorist threat', still less joining forces with the regime against the terrorists. Their criticism of terrorism was always in terms of its ineffective and counterproductive nature in relation to the real revolutionary struggle. This is because terrorism runs counter to the most basic principles of Marxism. Marx showed that the root cause of exploitation, oppression, tyranny and war was not bad individual rulers or bad governments but the division of society into classes, and the ownership and control of production by a minority class that live off the labour of the majority. The overthrow of a ruling class and the economic system on which it rests cannot be achieved by killing or frightening even large numbers of individuals, but only by the struggle of a new class which is the bearer of a new economic system. And of course they were vindicated by history. It was no terrorist bomb but the mass action of the working class that eventually toppled both Tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie.

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[14] For a broader understanding of Marxist theory of terrorism look at Molyneux (2004).

The Marxist response to terrorism formulated at the turn of the century has stood the test of time and has served as a guide to action in recent decades.

A new theory which has come to dominate the study of terrorism is the **Theory of Fourth Generation Warfare** (4GW)[15] . This theory asserts that a major change in warfare has occurred since the Treaty of Westphalia. War is no longer between states as it used to be—now the war is between the state and the non-state actors. According to Lind (one of the eminent theorists of 4GW), Fourth Generation War is the greatest change since the Peace of Westphalia, because it marks the end of the state's monopoly over war (Lind 2004:1). The observation truly reflects Creveld's (1991 18-25) seminal observation that "the end of the cold war heralded the birth of Fourth Generation Warfare, which is low intensity conflict-terrorism, guerrilla warfare and civil strife that has rendered obsolete the conventional methods of fighting them." The non-state actors do not use conventional methods of fighting. They use strategy based on manoeuvre, non-linearity and ideas. The aim of terrorists, according to this theory, is to defeat the enemy morally rather aiming to annihilate him physically. To quote Wilcox and Wilson (2002:3) "Future war would be characterized by 'very small independent action forces or cells'

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[15] For a detailed analysis of the theory, refer to the views of Lind, Hammes and
Creveld.

acting on mission type orders; a decreased dependence on logistics support; more emphasis on manoeuvre, and psychological goals rather than physical ones".

Counterterrorism strategy suggested by different school of thought

The prefix 'counter' in counter-terrorism and 'anti' in 'anti-terrorism' has a negative connotation, giving the impression that the state is fighting against the terrorists which should not be the case. It has been argued that counter-terrorism, to be effective, should aim at "winning the hearts and minds of the people"[3] because it is within the populace that the terrorists take asylum. Martin (2003) says that the counter-terrorism strategy of a state could be divided into two categories: soft line and hard line. Hard line and soft line approaches could be equated with repressive and reformatory strategy. Counter-terrorism could even be treated as a sub-variety of state terrorism, according to Wilkinson (1974). Like Wilkinson, Collins (1982) treats counter-terrorism as state sponsored terrorism and he discusses three varieties of it.

Thus, counter-terrorism strategy cannot be understood in terms of the dichotomy of the soft line/hard line approach, pre-emptive/proactive approach, repressive/reformative approach, and even scholars like Watson (1976), analysing counter-terrorism strategy, suggest that there is a strategy behind terrorism and the undoing of this strategy alone can abolish

terrorism. Watson (1976) argues that in reality there are four basic strategies of the terrorists which could be placed under two sub-heads: the visible and the invisible. The visible part consists of the violence which catches our attention, and the issues for which the terrorists claim to have perpetrated the violence. The invisible part consists of the propaganda and organising activities, which exploit the selected issues and systematically build up to the violence. Each strategy bears a cyclical relationship, setting up an action-reaction sequence, the cycle having self-refuelling features. Counter-terrorism must break this cycle, and this cycle should be broken at level 1, that is, propaganda and organising activities that exploit the selected issues. Jenkins (1975) makes a similar analysis when he says that there is a "theory of terrorism", which often works and so unless we try to think like terrorists, we are liable to miss the point. Although Schmid (2005) accuses Jenkins of not elaborating on what this "theory of terrorism" constitutes, he tries to present the underlying meaning of Jenkins' 'theory' wherein he says that acts of violence do not stand on their own but form part of a strategy, however rudimentary. The theory of Fourth Generation Warfare makes an attempt to study this 'theory' behind the mayhem perpetrated by the terrorists when it says that the current warfare is different from the past ones and lists the following characteristics of this new warfare:

➢ Conventional war between states is replaced by war between state and non-state actors.

➢ The traditional distinction between war and politics gets blurred.

➢ The non-state actors organise themselves into small-independent-cell like structures which function in a decentralised way.

➢ The war is fought through manoeuvre, with less reliability on logistical support.

➢ The war is fought to control the public or elite opinion.

➢ The aim of the war is to control the mind of the enemy, in other words, the aim is to morally defeat the enemy rather than destroying him physically.

➢ The non-state actors target the weakness of the state actor and do not aim at striking its strength.

Despite the fact that the theory of Fourth Generation Warfare has made an attempt the study the 'strategy' underlying the terrorists' *modus operandi,* it has not suggested concrete counter-terrorism measures for dismantling the terrorists' network. One could argue that the 'theory of terrorism', which the theorists of Fourth Generation Warfare or scholars like Jenkins, Watson and Schmid talk about, can be toppled by both offensive and defensive counter-terrorism strategies but each strategy has its pros and cons and, thus, the most prominent debate raised in any counter-terrorism strategy is the relationship between civil liberty and national security. Defenders of the hard line approach like Dolamore (2003) hold that the key to successful military action depends upon the ability of the state to strike at the terrorist's capability without

alienating public opinion.

Defenders of the soft line approach like Witschel (2003) argue that a mere national or even regional counter-terrorism strategy is not sufficient and what is needed is a coalition not based on values but on limited convergence of interest for a given time. In other words, the counter-terrorism strategy of different states should share certain features, which might facilitate collaboration among various countries of the world in their fight against terrorism. How far the prescription suggested by Witchel is effective at the operational level is questionable considering the fact that the US-led Coalition forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have not been that effective in Afghanistan. One may or may not agree with the views of Witschel or Dolamore but one could infer from the arguments of Watson and Jenkins that the counter-terrorism strategy of a state should attempt to unravel the terrorist's strategy. In fact, this is what forms the heart of the Theory of Fourth Generation Warfare. The Theory of Fourth Generation Warfare argues that there has been a pragmatic shift in warfare in the sense that now the state has lost its monopoly over war, with war now being fought between states and non-state actors. The theory says that non-state actors use non-linear, manoeuvre and decentralisation as the methods of warfare. To fight such warfare, one need to use non-conventional methods and strategies because conventional forces have been trained to fight conventional wars, and to win

against unconventional threats, one shouldn't depend on them. It is interesting to note the suggestions given by the Fourth Generation Warfare strategist Steven (2007:1) that "systems need to be decentralized, plans must be evolutionary, and the enterprise has to be driven by foresight, critical thinking, and a sense of urgency. Only then will the army cope with a form of warfare that 'resembles a standing wave pattern of continuously fluxing matter, energy and information'". Of course, the theory is silent on what is meant by non-conventional forces and how they will be constituted, but it seems to be an interesting field of inquiry which should be explored to understand the counter-terrorism debate better.

Wilkinson (2000) cites six possible paths out of terrorism. These could be terrorists abandoning terror after achieving their goal; terrorists abandoning terror perceiving the failure of their goal; terrorists being eliminated by determined and efficient military action; a political solution in which sufficient concessions are made to meet the grievances of the aggrieved groups; the law and order approach that deals with terrorism firmly under the criminal code; and the educative solution in which associations and institutions try to persuade terrorists to abandon the path of terrorism. Ross (2006), however, talks of eleven ways in which governments could counter terrorism. These include: appeasement, development of data bases and collection of relevant

intelligence, cutting off of financing, hardening of actual and potential targets, creation and use of 'third forces' like special military units or SWAT (Special Weapons And Tactics) teams to handle terrorists, changing police policies and practices regarding the use of force, development and use of anti-terrorist technology, approval and implementation of new international treaties, approval and implementation of new laws against terrorism both nationally and internationally, increased use of intelligence and surveillance of suspected terrorists and their supporters, and military response. Pillar (2003), by way of policy prescriptions to the US counter-terrorism strategy, gives fourteen principal recommendations as to what would constitute a sound counter-terrorism strategy for the United States. These, according to Pillar, include: injecting the counter-terrorist prescription into the foreign policy decision-making, paying attention to the full range of terrorist threats, disrupting terrorist infrastructures worldwide, using all available methods to counter-terrorism while not relying heavily on any one of them, tailoring different policies to meet different terrorist challenges, giving peace a chance, legislating sparingly, keeping terrorist lists honest, trying to engage the states sponsoring terrorism rather than just punishing them, helping other states with counter-terrorism, working with, and not against, allies, using public diplomacy to elucidate terrorism without glamorising terrorists, coming at par with the American people and remembering that more is

not always better.

All these scholars, while dealing with the measures to be adopted by states in their fight against terrorism, have not confined themselves within the boundaries created by the offence/defence debate, which, at face value, means that the counter-terrorism strategy should not get bogged by the offence/ defence debate. In any counter-terrorism strategy, whatever yields results should be tried, and the strategy formulators cannot bind themselves by the offence/ defence compulsions. What is important is winning the war against the terrorists. Of course, one has to be mindful of the misuse of power in the name of the counter-terrorism strategy but then counter-terrorism cannot be won purely through negotiations and developmental theory. There is something more to it and one needs to realise it, which is to say that before making the hardliners come to the negotiating table, one needs to put considerable pressure to weaken them so that the option of negotiation becomes viable for them. For example, one cannot start talks with the Taliban for the simple reason that they are too fundamentalist to understand the language of negotiations and, therefore, to bring them to the negotiating table, the state needs to use force against them to weaken them, so much such that they have no option but to negotiate with the government. It is in this context that Martin (2003) talks about policy options available to policy-makers in countering terrorism. He

basically talks about four policy options: use of force, measures other than war, which he sub-divides into repressive options and conciliatory options, and legalistic measures. However, Martin includes repressive options like air and missile strikes not as a variant of the use of force.

Apart from the above scholars, there are others who have discussed the counter-terrorism strategies but from a very different perspective. Flint (2003) has analysed the importance of the geographical context in understanding the causes of terrorism and its impact on existing counter-terrorist policies, making an appeal in favour of greater interaction between political geography and peace and conflict studies. Gurr (1970) holds that relative deprivation is the root cause of political violence and its remedy lies in its elimination. Many studies on counter-terrorism are case specific. For example, Rubin (2006) and Merari (2003) have worked on Israel's counter-terrorism. Similarly, the work of Tellis (2004) and Jenkins (1981) deals with the US response to terrorism and each of them has talked about different counter-terrorism strategies as applied in their home turf.

Conclusion:

The state underwent drastic transition in the course of its evolution from being a police state (protector from violence) to a welfare state (protector from violation).

Although the transition was a welcome one, somewhere along the road, the state was unable to meet the aspirations of a growing population, their desire for dignity, fair share, equity and justice (it was unable to protect the masses from a violation of their basic rights). The state was also restrained by the forces of globalisation which had its own dynamics playing havoc, with the heightening hiatus between the developed and the developing countries in the comity of nations, which could be interpreted to mean that the developing states were deprived of their legitimate place which again is a violation of the rights of the nation in the international arena. This interplay of 'globalisation' with 'regionalisation' and 'violation' with 'violence' created a 'security dilemma' for the state as well as for the individual. It has been rightly argued that there happens to be a misconception about 'national security' under which territorial integrity and upholding the government's authority, or, so to say, 'violence', takes the place of security of the people's lives and liberties[1]

The heightened perception of a threat to 'national security' in a way has been responsible for the increase in the "state's frequent use of brutal force" in the name of protecting the vital interests of the state, which needs serious rethinking and critical assessment. Going back to the idea of the need for

the formation of the state, even Hobbes' concept of an absolute Leviathan was challenged by authors like Lock and Rousseau, which suggests that the state never had the "monopoly to use violence"[2]. The state's use of violence always rested on the principle of "protection of the life, liberty and security" of its population. The rise in Fourth Generation Warfare or asymmetric warfare is reflective of the state's inability of exercising the 'constraints' associated with the doctrine of "monopoly on the use of violence" and in no way reflects loss of the state's monopoly in war, which it enjoys in conventional warfare. The obvious consequence of which has been the "use of violence" by non-state actors to remind the state that it has "lost its legitimate right of using violence" because of its failure in performing the tasks assigned with the principle of "how and in what circumstances" of "using violence".

Further, looking into the postulates proposed by the structural, behavioural, psychological, instrumental, organisational and Fourth Generation Warfare theories, one comes to the conclusion that their analyses and prescriptions for counter-terrorism overlap in most of the cases. For example, both instrumental and psychological theories believe that terrorists are made by the society and it is through the reform of society that one can think of eradicating terrorism from the society, which is what the structural theory also

prescribes. The only difference between them is that they assign different reasons for the origin and perpetuation of terrorism. For structuralists, it is the system with its inequality and other malaise that breeds terrorists whereas the instrumentalists look at the individuals' background, their mental make-up and their upbringing to relate it to their affinity to terrorist activities. The organisational theory looks at the dynamics of group behaviour, the compulsions and constraints of running an organisation and the individual's aspirations in it to trace the growth and sustenance of terrorist organisations. Likewise, Fourth Generation Warfare theory looks into the changes in the mode of warfare and their impact on the growth of terrorism.

Each mainstream theory has looked at the prism of terrorism and counter-terrorism from a different angle and, accordingly, could only be considered as partly true of explaining the phenomenon of terrorism. Apart from these mainstream theories of international relations, there are other theories which have looked at the dynamics of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Each school has tried to look at the problem of terrorism from a different perspective and in the process, has given a whole new interpretation to the menace of terrorism. Thus, we have structural theory, behavioural theory, instrumental theory, organisational theory and the theory of Fourth Generation Warfare, each of which has looked at the problem of terrorism and counter-terrorism through a different angle. A proper understanding of each of these is essential to

evolve a consensual strategy of fighting terrorism. When Wilkinson (2003) talks about the different criteria of distinguishing between a terrorist and a freedom fighter to arrive at a counter-measure which would be compatible with the democratic principles, rule of law and respect for human rights, he is, in a way, trying to make this distinction between different schools of thought apparent to the counter-terrorist forces so that they do not get trapped in the controversy of terrorists vs. freedom fighters.

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Figure One

Source:

http://rationalinsurgent.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/figur
e1-4.jpg

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